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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 27, 2020, Virginia became the thirty-eighth state to
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).2 Yet despite having
met the amending requirements of Article V, the Twenty-Eighth
Amendment has not been promulgated by the National Archivist,
* Clarence J. TeSelle Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I
would like to thank Jon Mills, Winsome McIntosh, and Dean Laura Rosenbury for their sup-
port of this research. I would also like to thank Rona Kitchen and the Program Committee
of the 2020 AALS Women in Legal Education Section for their hard work in putting on such
an amazing program. And I would also like to thank the students of the Duquesne Law
Review for their scholarly assistance in bringing this article to print.
1. Equal Rights Amendment Extension: Hearings on H.J. Res. 638 Before the Sub-
comm. on Civ. & Const. Rts. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. at
138 (1977) (testimony of Prof. Van Alstyne).
2. S.J. Res. 1, 2020 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020); see Complaint at 10 11, Virginia v. Fer-
riero, 466 F. Supp. 3d 253 (D.D.C. June 12, 2020) (No. 20-242).
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as required by federal statute.3 The ERA remains in legitimacy
limbo4 as we await judicial resolution of a number of legal ques-
tions. And while we wait, the two-year window continues to wind
down for federal, state, and local governments to implement the
equality mandate of equal rights on the basis of sex.5 Whether the
Supreme Court will grant certiorari, or will decide the issues in fa-
vor of equality, are questions that only the nine unelected justices
can answer. But the future implications of any decision the Court
makes will likely stretch far beyond the Twenty-Eighth Amend-
ment, as the ERA has landed in a vortex of constitutional indeter-
minacy. For nearly two-and-a-half centuries, numerous substan-
tive and procedural questions have arisen, been dismissed or nar-
rowed, lingered in the shadows, become moot, or otherwise left un-
resolved, apparently awaiting the perfect test case. Virtually all of
these unresolved issues are implicated by the century-long passage
of the ERA.
The ERA was first proposed in 1923 at the urging of suffragette
Alice Paul. But it did not receive Congressional approval until
forty-nine years later, in 1972. But when submitted to the states
for ratification, it was saddled with a seven-year deadline in its pre-
amble.6 Only thirty-five states had ratified by the end of the seven-
year deadline and five states had purported to rescind their ratifi-
cations. In 1978, Congress extended the deadline by three years
and three months, until June 22, 1982;7 however, no states ratified
or rescinded during the extension period. When the ratification pe-
riod expired, the proposal was lacking either three or eight ratifica-
tions to reach the thirty-eight required by Article V. In 2017, how-
ever, Nevada ratified the ERA, Illinois did so in 2018, and Virginia
did in 2020, forty-eight years after it was sent to the states.8 After
ninety-seven years, the legal issues underlying the ERA are no
longer mere abstractions, but present direct, unresolved
3. 1 U.S.C. § 106(b) (requiring the Archivist to cause the amendment to be published
when he has received the requisite number of certificates of ratification).
4. Brendon Troy Ishikawa, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About How Amend-
ments Are Made, but Were Afraid to Ask, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 570 (1997).
5. Section 3 of the ERA provides that the amendment “shall take effect two years after
the date of ratification.” H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1972).
6. Id. (“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol-
lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its
submission by the Congress[.]”).
7. See H.R.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong., 92 Stat. 3799 (1978).
8. Kathryn Elizabeth Colohan et al., Ratification Info State by State, ERA,
https://www.equalrightsamendment.org/era-ratification-map (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
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constitutional questions about the scope and interpretation of the
Article V process.
Article V provides two roles for Congress: to propose amendments
with a two-thirds super majority (a power it shares with the states),
and to determine the mode of ratification (between state legisla-
tures and state conventions).9 The mode-of-ratification power is not
shared with the states, which have the sole power to ratify. Article
V states that amendments shall be deemed “valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of [the] Constitution, when ratified by the Legis-
latures of three-fourths of the several States . . . .”10 The relatively
spare language of Article V does not expressly grant to Congress
the power to impose deadlines on the states for ratification, nor does
it expressly permit states to rescind their prior ratifications. It does
not give to Congress the power to determine how, when, or whether
an amendment shall be ratified. Nor does it grant to Congress the
power to determine the legal sufficiency of state ratifications.
These glaring gaps have been the subject of intense scholarship,
some limited judicial precedents, and many self-serving pronounce-
ments by members of Congress, and yet all these questions remain
essentially unsettled.11 More importantly, their resolution may
have lasting effects on constitutional law and constitutional reform.
In a nutshell, there are at least four unprecedented legal issues
that require resolution to determine the validity of the ERA: two
substantive and two procedural. First, it must be determined if the
seven-year deadline for ratification is a permissible exercise of Con-
gress’ Article V powers, or if it is an impermissible infringement of
the states’ sole power to control ratification. For a variety of struc-
tural and federalism reasons, the history and allocation of powers
of Article V suggest that Congress may not impose such a draconian
limit on the states, which potentially thwarts their constitutional
function to determine both whether to ratify and when to ratify
9. Article V states in full:
[t]he Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Con-
stitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may
be proposed by the Congress . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. V.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. For the most thorough and measured exposition of virtually all matters involving
Article V, see DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776–2015 (2016).
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proposed constitutional amendments.12 Second, it must be deter-
mined if the five states that purportedly rescinded their ratifica-
tions may do so. Although states have attempted to rescind in the
past, no rescission has ever been recognized as valid.13 As yet, how-
ever, the federal courts have not weighed in on the matter.14
Third, the procedure for certifying an amendment calls for the
National Archivist to proclaim the amendment’s passage when he
receives the required number of state ratification certificates.15
This duty was first assigned to the Secretary of State, then to the
Administrator of General Services, and now resides with the Archi-
vist.16 It is a ministerial duty and does not authorize the Archivist
to judge the legal sufficiency of the ratifications he has received and
yet, to date, the Archivist has not proclaimed the ERA as the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment.17 He is relying on a Department of
Justice opinion that the seven-year deadline is valid to justify his
failure to act.18 That reliance may violate his statutory obligation,
and potentially interposes the executive branch in the Article V
amendment process. And fourth, Supreme Court precedent has
been interpreted to hold that determining the answer to some or all
of these questions might fall within the political question doctrine
and should be left to Congress, one of the parties whose Article V
powers is at issue.19
These four questions create a truly tangled web of constitutional
indeterminacy. If Congress has the sole jurisdiction to settle Article
V controversies, then it has the power to aggrandize itself at the
expense of the states. If Congress may give the Archivist the power
12. See Danaya C. Wright, “Great Variety of Relevant Conditions, Political, Social and
Economic”: The Constitutionality of Congressional Deadlines on Amendment Proposals Un-
der Article V, 28 WM. &MARY BILL RTS. J. 45 (2019).
13. See discussion infra notes 95 113 and accompanying text.
14. The federal District Court for the District of Idaho did address the validity of Idaho’s
rescission of the ERA in Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (D. Idaho 1981), but that
decision was vacated by the Supreme Court when the deadline passed. See Nat’l Org. for
Women v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982) (mem.). What that Court planned to do with the deci-
sion, which is ill-reasoned and problematic on many levels, as explained below, is anyone’s
guess. What the current Court will do, is also anyone’s guess.
15. 1 U.S.C. § 106(b).
16. Until 1818, the Secretary of State certified amendments as a matter of course. In
1818, Congress enacted a statute officially assigning that duty to the Secretary. In 1951,
Congress amended the statute to transfer the responsibility to the Administrator of General
Services who was in charge of publishing the Federal Register. See H.R. 3899, 82d Cong. §
106(b) (1951). In 1984 the job was transferred to the National Archivist. See 1 U.S.C. §
106(b).
17. Press Release, National Archives, Statement on Equal Rights Amendment Debate
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2020/nr20-26 (requesting
guidance on actions to take after the ERA’s ratification from the Office of Legal Counsel).
18. Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, 44 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2020).
19. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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to determine the validity of state ratifications, then Congress is giv-
ing power to the Executive branch that Article V clearly does not
grant to it. Logically, the federal courts, and the Supreme Court in
the end, are the sensible repositories of power to resolve these ques-
tions, and yet the Court has historically been very reluctant to in-
terpose. In the rare instances in which the Court has addressed
Article V challenges, it has generally upheld the questioned acts,
whether they are allegedly improper state ratifications or the valid-
ity of an amendment saddled with an arguably unconstitutional
deadline.20 In some instances, the Court has held that certain mat-
ters are conclusive, like the Secretary of State’s certificate of ratifi-
cation, and that there is no scope for judicial review of the adequacy
of earlier steps in the amendment process.21 Of most concern, how-
ever, is the Court’s suggestion that Article V issues are non-justici-
able political questions, leaving to Congress the power to decide
whether states have properly ratified amendment proposals.22 And
in analyzing these issues together, one is easily turned around and
upside down, dizzy with trying to make sense of the Court’s brief
and enigmatic pronouncements in this area.
Yet, if we disaggregate the various issues and hone in on the sub-
stantive merits of each, we can begin to make some sense of the
unprecedented indeterminacy underlying Article V. In this article,
I focus exclusively on the narrow issue of whether states may
change their minds, whether they may ratify after having rejected
an amendment, and whether theymay rescind after having ratified.
The Supreme Court has held that a state may ratify after rejec-
tion,23 but it has not provided any clear precedent on whether states
may rescind, and Article V does not provide any explicit power to
do so. Any implied powers seem inconsistent with the text and his-
torical understanding of Article V, and prior precedents have de-
nied states the power to rescind.24 Moreover, legislation and
amendments proposed by Congress to expressly permit states to re-
scind up until the ratification by three-fourths of the states have all
failed.25 Numerous states that have considered whether they can
20. Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474, 477 78 (1939); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 456; United
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 734 (1931); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922);
Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); Dillon v Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921); Hawke
v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920); Rhode Island v. Palmer (National Prohibition Cases), 253
U.S. 350, 388 (1920).
21. Chandler, 307 U.S. at 477–78; Sprague, 282 U.S. at 734; Leser, 258 U.S. at 137.
22. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450.
23. Id. at 456; Chandler, 307 U.S. at 477–78.
24. See discussion infra notes 95 113 and accompanying text.
25. KYVIG, supra note 11, at 251–53; see also George Stewart Brown, The “New Bill of
Rights” Amendment, 9 VA. L. REV. 14, 14–24 (1922).
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rescind have concluded that rescission is ineffective.26 The Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) determined that rescissions are ineffective,27
and scholars agree that rescissions have never been legally effec-
tive.28 Nevertheless, Nebraska (1973), Tennessee (1974), Idaho
(1977), Kentucky (1978), and South Dakota (1979) attempted to re-
scind their ratifications of the ERA and, unless five other states rat-
ify in short order, the constitutionality of state rescissions will need
to be resolved before the ERA is recognized as the Twenty-Eighth
Amendment.29 In this article, I explore the complex process under-
lying the rescission question and the evidence a court is likely to
examine in its effort to settle this intriguing question. But first, we
must descend into the rabbit hole that is Article V.
II. INTO THE RABBITHOLE: THE STATES’ RATIFICATION FUNCTION
UNDER ARTICLE V
The amendment process outlined in Article V of the Constitution
gives the states sole authority to ratify a proposed amendment. The
text states that an amendment becomes valid “to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legis-
latures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof . . . .”30 The only legally-operative act through
which the states exercise power under Article V is to ratify. Once
states have ratified, their Constitutional role has arguably ended.31
Though it might be tempting to conclude that if the ratification
power resides solely in the states, they should also have the power
to rescind, that conclusion is problematic on many levels. It is in-
consistent with both the amendment process and the drafters’
26. See THOMAS JAMES NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS
SOURCES AND ITSAPPLICATION 171 (1922) (“In 1919 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in
answer to a question propounded by the Governor, declared that the legislature could not
rescind its ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, establishing prohibition.”); see also
Memorandum from Gov. Marcus L. Ward to the Senate of the State of New Jersey (Feb. 25,
1868) (“When such proposal is accepted and approved, the amendment ratified and returned
to the General Government by which it was submitted, the transaction is completed, the
decision of the State has been rendered, and the power of the Legislature over the subject is
spent. No further action can be taken . . . .”).
27. Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable
Robert J. Lipshutz, Counsel to the President (Oct. 31, 1977); see also H.R REP. NO. 95-1405,
at 12–16 (1978); Power of a State Legislature to Rescind Its Ratification of a Constitutional
Amendment, 1 Op. O.L.C. 13, 15 (1977).
28. See discussion of scholarship infra at notes 170 183 and accompanying text.
29. John Carrol, Constitutional Amendment; Rescission of Ratification; Extension of Rat-
ification Period, State of Idaho v. Freeman, 16 AKRON L. REV. 151, 153 n.16 (1983).
30. U.S. CONST. art. V.
31. See 2 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY
APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1310–11 (1910).
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intent, as it would deviate from prior precedent and the general
consensus of scholars, judges, and members of Congress, and, most
importantly, it would impose an element of uncertainty that would
be destabilizing to the constitution-making process. 32 For we must
begin any analysis of Article V procedures sensitive to the fact that
ratifying the Constitution in 1789, and amending it through the
finely-wrought process set out in Article V, are acts of constitution-
making that can, and have, profoundly affected the legitimacy of
our constitutional republic and the rule of law.
Perhaps the foremost principle in this constitution-making pro-
cess is the fact that Article V establishes a procedure in which
states, qua states, are the key participants in the project. States,
through their elected conventions, ratified the constitution in 1789,
and their legislatures ratified every subsequent amendment except
the Twenty-First. The framers were clear that the drafting of the
constitution, and any amendments, was a process to be driven by
the states.33 The original draft of the constitution had no role for
Congress in the amendment process; the power to propose amend-
ments along with the states was added only after Alexander Ham-
ilton argued that the national government would be more attuned
to any defects in its organic document than the states.34 But the
framers were quite clear that the states were both necessary and
sufficient participants in the amendment process, as they could call
a convention to propose amendments, and they have the sole ratifi-
cation power. The states, as legal actors, have the power to amend
the constitution when they deem it necessary, regardless of the
wishes of Congress, as they did when they ratified the new consti-
tution in 1789.
It does not help matters, however, that the Article V process for
ratifying is assigned to state legislatures with no guidance as to
what bodies constitute a legislature35 or what process a state
32. RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN WITH JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE
CONSTITUTION SOMUCH, WHYDOWEKEEP TRYING TOCHANGE IT? 254 (1st ed. 1993) (“Once
a state rejects an amendment, it is free to reconsider and ratify it; however, once a state
ratifies an amendment, it may not rescind that ratification . . . . To permit rescission of a
ratification would be to confuse and perhaps derail the amending process’s orderly function-
ing.”); see also Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 421 27 (1983); SAMUEL S. FREEDMAN& PAMELA
J. NAUGHTON, ERA: MAY A STATE CHANGE ITS VOTE? (1978).
33. The framers expressly rejected a provision that would require Congressional ap-
proval of constitutional amendments, and only added Congress’ power to propose as an af-
terthought. KYVIG, supra note 11, at 56 57.
34. Id.
35. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the term legislature in Article V re-
ferred to the general public in which all legislative powers ultimately lie in Hawke v. Smith,
253 U.S. 221, 228 29 (1920).
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legislature must follow when engaging in their constitutional role.36
James Madison insisted that such “difficulties . . . as to the form,
the quorum, &c. . . . in Constitutional regulations ought to be as
much as possible avoided.”37 As a result of this lack of detail, some
legislatures have established clear guidance, such as a supermajor-
ity of both houses of its legislature;38 others have not.39 Some re-
quire only a simple majority; others treat ratification like a regular
bill and perhaps require gubernatorial approval.40 Some have re-
quired an intervening election of at least one house before a consti-
tutional amendment proposal may be ratified, although that re-
quirement has been held to be unconstitutional.41 Some treat the
process as similar to bill passage while others treat it as a resolu-
tion.42 Some require amendments be ratified by the same margin
as a state constitutional amendment.43 A few states even have dif-
ferent rules for their house and their senate.44 And what is worse,
36. This makes some sense as the states were sovereign entities and could be assumed
to have a process in place for making decisions that would bind the states qua states. For a
discussion of the relationship between the people and the states, see generally Andrew G.I.
Kilberg, We the People: The Original Meaning of Popular Sovereignty, 100 VA. L. REV. 1061
(2014).
37. BERNSTEIN WITH AGEL, supra note 32, at 21.
38. See SUSANW. KANNARR, RULES OF THEKAN. H. OFREPS., 2019–2020 SESS., at § 2707
(2019) (requiring a two-thirds majority of all elected members to ratify a constitutional
amendment); S. Res. 17(f)(4) (Colo. 2019); H.R. Res. 26(b) (Colo. 2019) (requiring a two-thirds
majority of all elected members to ratify a constitutional amendment); see also ILL. CONST.
art. XIV, § 4 (requiring a three-fifths vote of all elected members of each house, as well as an
intervening election); DAVID C. HUCKABEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-922 GOV, RATIFICATION
OF AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 2 n.4 (1997) (stating that Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho, and Alabama also require supermajorities of all elected members). But see Dyer v.
Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (holding the Illinois Constitution’s three-fifths ma-
jority was non-binding, despite Illinois’s legislative rules also calling for a three-fifths major-
ity vote).
39. Florida has no rules on whether ratification follows regular bill procedures or resolu-
tion procedures, and the Florida Constitution requires an intervening election, which has
been held to be unconstitutional. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1; Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F.
Supp. 575, 578 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
40. Interim Governor of Kentucky, Thelma Stovall vetoed the resolution rescinding the
ERA as did Governor Ward of New Jersey in 1868. Livingston Taylor, ERA Rescission Vetoed
in Kentucky, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/poli-
tics/1978/03/21/era-rescission-vetoed-in-kentucky/b6a72232-f433-40b5-b2be-ddd23914e204/;
Ward, supra note 26.
41. Tennessee and Florida both have provisions in their constitutions requiring an inter-
vening election, but they have been held to be unconstitutional in Walker v. Dunn, 498
S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1972) and Trombetta, 353 F. Supp. at 578.
42. Seventeen states appear to require a simple majority, the same as is required for bill
passage, while a handful (three) require different majorities between their two houses. See
Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1305 n.34.
43. Twenty-four states require a constitutional majority. Id.
44. See id.
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the rules are usually located deep within their legislative rulebooks,
are difficult to locate, and may change with every session.45
This diversity in procedure means that the validity of ratification,
and its justiciability, can be quite complicated questions. Consider
a few situations. A state legislature could, after ratifying a consti-
tutional amendment by a simple majority, in violation of its own
rules requiring a super-majority, send a certificate of ratification to
the Secretary of State.46 Would it be in violation of Article V? Since
many states permit ratification by a simple majority, why would the
federal courts intervene to uphold a state rule that the state has
chosen to ignore? What benefit would the federal courts see in en-
forcing a more stringent standard, even if that is the law of the
state? On the other hand, if a state submitted a certificate of rati-
fication after the proposal failed to receive even a majority of legis-
lative votes, one would hope that the federal courts would strike
that certificate. But on what basis should we draw such a distinc-
tion other than on some implied Article V baseline? Assuming there
is some procedural requirement that legislative ratification re-
quires, at minimum, a majority vote of a state legislature, does that
mean a majority of the elected members, or just a majority of those
present, or a majority of a quorum? Could ten legislators vote in
the dead of night?
Robert Hajdu and Bruce Rosenblum suggest that in questionable
cases “the propriety of state efforts should depend upon whether
these efforts interfere with the constitutionally protected role of the
legislatures.”47 In other words, where states establish rules that
create impediments to the ratification process, courts should be
skeptical and strike them down, as with an intervening election or
requirement of a popular referendum, and where the state rules at-
tempt to dictate the substantive outcome of legislative participation
under Article V, the courts also should intervene. But where state
rules simply facilitate the ratification process, they should be
judged deferentially.
Thus, if a state legislature violated its own procedure it would
seem to be an appropriate issue for state courts, although what kind
of remedy would be available from a state court against a legisla-
ture engaging in a federal constitutional function is another
45. See DAVID C. HUCKABEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-922 GOV, RATIFICATION OF
AMENDMENTS TO THEU.S. CONSTITUTION 5 (1997). Legislative rules are usually voted upon
at the beginning of each session of a state’s legislature.
46. Certain members of the Illinois legislature attempted to do precisely this, but the
decision in Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1308 09, upheld the super-majority requirement.
47. Robert Hajdu & Bruce E. Rosenblum, The Process of Constitutional Amendment, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 106, 116 (1979).
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interesting question.48 But back to the simple question at hand. If
a state has a rule requiring a super-majority and a legislature rati-
fies with a simple majority, it would have violated its own rules but
not necessarily Article V. But if it ratified on less than a majority,
presumably that would fall below the basic constitutional threshold
and violate Article V in a determination that should be made by the
federal courts. Similarly, if the governor simply sent an executive
order ratifying an amendment, it should be rejected, but if the lieu-
tenant governor voted to break a tie in the state senate,49 there
would be no constitutional infirmity since state law permits execu-
tive officials to have some limited legislative functions. Whether
these are substantive/procedural distinctions or not is unclear. But
the questions force us to think about the basic framework of Article
V, which requires state legislatures to exercise the constitution-
making function within some range of acceptable standards appro-
priate to a representative body but with absolutely no guidance
from Congress or Article V.
An interesting version of this issue arose when the Illinois legis-
lature voted to ratify the ERA, but it could only muster a simple
majority, and not the three-fifths required by their legislative rules
and by the Illinois Constitution. Judge John Paul Stevens, prior to
his stint on the Supreme Court, ruled in Dyer v. Blair that the su-
per-majority legislative rule was permissible, but that the Consti-
tutional super-majority rule was not, which seems puzzling at first
glance.50 In analyzing the ratification function articulated in Arti-
cle V, Judge Stevens reasoned:
[w]e may take it as decided, therefore, that an extraordinary
majority is not required by federal law. There is, moreover,
some evidence that when article V was drafted the framers as-
sumed that state legislatures would act by majority vote. That
evidence, like the text of article V itself, is equally consistent
with the view that a majority of a quorum would be sufficient,
48. There are real questions about what remedy a state court can give if a state legislator
claims that its body failed to comply with its own rules. Could an injunction issue against
the National Archivist to return the certificate? Could an injunction issue against the gov-
ernor to request return of the certificate? Would the Archivist be compelled to return the
certificate if the governor asked for it back? These issues were dodged in Chandler v. Wise,
307 U.S. 474 (1939), but have arisen in the context of the ERA as litigants wonder what
remedy is appropriate and who the proper defendant should be. See also Chase v. Billings,
170 A. 903, 905 (Vt. 1934) (grappling with this very issue).
49. This was alleged to be one of the infirmities in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,
446 47 (1939), for which the Court failed to muster a majority to determine whether the tie-
breaking vote was a violation of the state’s ratification procedure.
50. Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1307.
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or with a view that a majority of the elected legislators would
be required. And, of course, it is also consistent with the view
that the framers did not intend to impose either of those alter-
natives upon the state legislators, but, instead, intended to
leave that choice to the ratifying assemblies. . . . If the framers
had intended to require the state legislatures to act by simple
majority, we think they would have said so explicitly. . . . We
think the omission more reasonably indicates that the framers
intended to treat the determination of the vote required to pass
a ratifying resolution as an aspect of the process that each state
legislature, or state convention, may specify for itself.51
Judge Stevens concluded that Article V neither requires nor pro-
hibits either a simple majority or a super-majority, and that each
state legislature may decide for itself what constitutes ratification
of a constitutional amendment.52 Assuming Article V did not estab-
lish a standard, Stevens then concluded that the legislature may
set a three-fifths requirement in its rules, and that requirement
would be binding.53 But the people of Illinois do not have the con-
stitutional right to determine the legislative standard, and there-
fore the Illinois Constitution’s requirement was void under Article
V.54 Stevens therefore concluded that Illinois had not ratified the
ERA even though the resolution had received a positive majority
vote, which was all that Article V required or that the framers likely
intended, because the Illinois legislature had chosen a higher
standard.
While this decision is not inconsistent with the spare language of
Article V, it leaves us with little guidance on what would happen if
Illinois, in violation of its own rules, had submitted the certificate
of ratification to the Secretary of State55 or had set a rule that was
perhaps too stringent, like requiring a unanimous vote of both
houses. Hajdu and Rosenblum’s functionalist rules may allow
states some latitude when they are not attempting to make the rat-
ification process too cumbersome, but the proverbial devil is in the
details. Consider the role of public opinion in legislation. What if
the populace of a state opposed a proposed amendment and voted a
51. Id. at 1305 06 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 1307.
53. Id. at 1308.
54. Id.
55. In Chandler v. Wise, it was alleged that the Kentucky legislature’s ratification of the
Child Labor Amendment was unconstitutional because Kentucky had previously rejected the
amendment. The Kentucky Supreme Court agreed that the legislative ratification was ultra
vires, but the Supreme Court held that the certificate of ratification sent by the governor was
conclusive, thereby declining to intervene in the state’s procedural spat. 307 U.S. 474 (1939).
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state constitutional amendment to prohibit its legislature from rat-
ifying the proposal? If the legislature ratified anyway, would that
ratification be valid? What if the legislature did not ratify but
would have done so except for the state constitutional bar? Should
a court strike the state constitutional amendment as a barrier to a
federal constitutional process? What if the legislature opposed an
amendment, but the public voted to amend the state constitution to
require the legislature vote to ratify despite its opposition? Could
the popular will be expressed through legislative referenda, as in
California, if it expressly sought to ratify an amendment proposal?
If a popular vote can result in legislation pursuant to state law, why
could a popular referendum not result in a constitutional amend-
ment ratification if the state’s law provides that constitutional
amendments are ratified through the same process as bill pas-
sage?56
Although these questions may seem like a riff on law school ex-
ams, they are not entirely farfetched. Ohio had a law requiring a
public referendum following a state legislative vote to ratify any
amendment, to ensure that the legislature’s ratification reflected
the popular will. It was stricken by the Supreme Court in Hawke
v. Smith57 on the grounds that the framers intended the term legis-
lature, in Article V, in its common-sense meaning as the representa-
tive body of the state. But if the people can pass legislation through
referenda, then why could they also not act in a legislative capacity
and vote to ratify an amendment legislatively? This is a particu-
larly relevant question in the context of the ERA, which has the
support of more than eighty percent of the public, but could be
blocked by a bare majority of the elected members of the smallest
of thirteen state legislative houses.58 If a state legislature is badly
gerrymandered, and a majority of the people of the state want a
constitutional amendment that, for instance, limits
56. See Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States
Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amendment Pro-
cess?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037 (2000).
57. 253 U.S. 221, 230 (1920).
58. ABA 2020 Survey of Civic Literacy, AMERICAN BAR ASSN., https://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/public_education/2020-survey-civ-lit-full-report.pdf
(last visited Jan. 23, 2020). If the smaller legislative house of the thirteen least populous
states (Wyoming, Vermont, Alaska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Delaware, Rhode Island,
Montana, Maine, New Hampshire, Hawaii, West Virginia, and Idaho) blocked a popular
amendment, then a bare majority of representatives of roughly 14.5 million people could
thwart the wishes of the other 315 million people. Of course, this was a concern during
debates over Article V and is endemic to our constitutional structure which gives the smaller
states more power.
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gerrymandering, should they not be able to either force their legis-
lature to ratify, or ratify the amendment themselves?59
These questions are unanswered by the sparse text of Article V,
and the problems become evenmurkier as we explore the gray areas
between legislative and constitutional decision-making. As Hajdu
and Rosenblum note, expressions of popular will that may be objec-
tionable if they determine the outcome, but not if they are merely
advisory, can be difficult to distinguish when we consider that po-
litical pressures and responsiveness to one’s constituents is the
hallmark of representative democracy.60 During the intense de-
bates before and after adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment,
there were numerous lawsuits brought over state referendum pro-
cedures where opponents of the amendment sought to get on the
ballot a bill opposing Prohibition and mandating that the state leg-
islatures rescind.61 Some were couched as advisory opinions. But
in a similar case involving the ERA in 1978, the opponents to the
referendum cogently argued that a referendum would upset the Ar-
ticle V process by making proponents engage in lobbying for general
support throughout the state and not just with legislators, funda-
mentally changing the nature of amendment ratifications.62 For if
a legislator voted against the “advisory opinion,” that vote would
surely be used against him or her in the next election.
The framers may have envisioned state legislatures as bulwarks
against populist pressures, but today they can be bellwethers of
popular consensus or be captured by special interests and act coun-
ter to the popular will. If the framers chose legislatures as the rat-
ifying bodies because they had some particular characteristic that
was crucial to the ratification process, then it is not at all clear that
they have those same characteristics today. But it is clear that the
political lobbying efforts will be very different if the audience is the
state legislature only, or the population generally.
A further unknown is whether Congress could mandate a partic-
ular state legislative procedure. Scholars have suggested that it is
unlikely that Congress could constitutionally legislate a particular
59. This is particularly salient in a state like Florida with its constitutional referendum
procedure and a heavily gerrymandered legislature that has not ratified the Sixteenth, the
Seventeenth, the Twenty-Third, or the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, nor has it ratified the
ERA.
60. Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra note 47, at 115 n.28.
61. See generally Barlotti v. Lyons, 189 P. 282 (Cal. 1920); Prior v. Noland, 188 P. 729
(Colo. 1920); Decher v. Sec’y of State, 177 N.W. 388 (Mich. 1920); Carson v. Sullivan, 223
S.W. 571 (Mo. 1920); State ex rel. Gill v. Morris, 191 P. 364 (Okla. 1920).
62. Kimble v. Swackhamer, 584 P.2d 161, 163 64 (Nev. 1978) (Gunderson, J., dissent-
ing).
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procedure, and previous Congressional efforts to require certain
procedures, such as a popular referendum, an intervening election,
or when the state legislatures must take up a proposal, have all
failed.63 One bill went so far as to dictate what days a state legisla-
ture must take up an amendment proposal after its submission to
the state.64 So far, Congress has been circumspect and the only leg-
islation it has passed dealing with Article V is the very simple pro-
vision requiring the National Archivist, and before that the Secre-
tary of State, to publish an amendment once the requisite number
of state ratification certificates were received.65 To the extent Arti-
cle V places the ratification power solely in the states, Congres-
sional legislation that defines how that ratification power shall be
exercised (by a super-majority, for instance), when it shall be exer-
cised (within a specific period of time), or what counts as ratification
(conditional or not) would profoundly change the balance of power
between the states. Congress could certainly propose a constitu-
tional amendment to the Article V process clearing up many of
these uncertainties, but simple legislation cannot override the pro-
cess detailed in the Constitution, even if it is vague and porous. And
although I personally try to embrace indeterminacy and ambiguity,
as they make life a bit more interesting,66 I am not enamored of
them in the procedural details of amending a constitution.
Furthermore, in case the lack of express guidance in Article V
and Congress’ inaction is not enough indeterminacy, the Supreme
Court has avoided most legal challenges to the sufficiency of state
ratifications, instead ruling that a ratification certificate is conclu-
sive that the state followed its own procedures.67 Or the Court has
sidestepped the issue, as in Coleman v. Miller, when it refused to
decide whether Kansas had properly ratified the Child Labor
Amendment when the Lieutenant Governor broke a tie in the state
63. Lester Orfield, in his 1942 treatise, argued that Congress does not have this power.
LESTER BERNHARDTORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 64 65 (1942);
see Power of a State Legislature to Rescind Its Ratification of a Constitutional Amendment,
1 Op. O.L.C. 13, 15 (1977) (stating that Congress cannot give to the States a right to rescind
by any means short of amending Article V of the Constitution.).
64. In 1869, a resolution was introduced to require that state legislatures discuss pro-
posed constitutional amendments on the sixth day of their next legislative session and con-
tinue to discuss it until a final decision is made. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 75, 102,
334 (1869). See also Edward S. Corwin & Mary Louise Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of
Constitutional Amendment, 26 NOTREDAME L. REV. 185, 208 (1951) (“Whether such a meas-
ure is within the power of Congress incident to the submission of amendments is doubtful.”).
65. 1 U.S.C. § 106(b).
66. I live by Marc Poirier’s wonderful article, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doc-
trine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002).
67. Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474, 477 (1939); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137
(1922).
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Senate.68 In Chandler v. Wise69 the Court dismissed a challenge to
a post-rejection ratification as moot, and in Fairchild v. Hughes70 it
dismissed a challenge to state ratifications of the Nineteenth
Amendment for lack of standing. The only Article V cases question-
ing the validity of state ratifications that the Supreme Court has
decided on the merits were the rejection of Ohio’s requirement of a
public referendum in Hawke v. Smith and the dismissal of chal-
lenges to the Nineteenth Amendment on the grounds that women’s
suffrage conflicted with state constitutional requirements in Leser
v. Garnett.71 All five of these decisions resulted in affirmance of the
state legislative ratifications, despite allegations of impropriety in
the ratification process, although three were not even on the mer-
its.72
Lest we shrug off the indeterminacy as mere matters of detail
that raise concerns only in rare and exceptional cases, the experi-
ence of history speaks otherwise. When opponents of the Four-
teenth Amendment in the Tennessee legislature decided to skip
town to defeat a quorum, they were located, held under arrest, and
counted for quorum purposes even though they were not allowed to
vote.73 The case of Texas Democratic legislators leaving the state
to prevent voting on redistricting legislation in 2003 and Oregon
Republican legislators leaving to prevent a vote on climate change
reminds us that not that much has changed in state politics since
1867 and the Tennessee experience is sadly not as exceptional as
one might hope.74 With the Trump administration’s severe testing
of constitutional standards and norms in so many areas, the
68. 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939).
69. 307 U.S. at 477.
70. 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
71. 258 U.S. at 130; Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
72. The Court has only decided nine Article V cases, the other four being irrelevant:
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (holding that there was no distinction in Arti-
cle V that would preclude certain types of amendments that were ratified by legislatures
rather than conventions); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (holding that amendments are
self-executing upon ratification by the last state, and that validly-ratified amendments con-
taining Congressional deadlines are not ipso facto void); Rhode Island v. Palmer (National
Prohibition Cases), 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (holding that there were no substantive limits on the
types of amendments that could be ratified under Article V); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3
U.S. 378 (1798) (holding that the Presidential signature is not required in Article V amend-
ments).
73. KYVIG, supra note 11, at 170.
74. Ed Lavandera, Texas House Paralyzed by Democratic Walkout, CNN
(May 19, 2003, 12:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/13/texas.legislatur
e/; see also Chip Brownlee, Oregon’s Legislative Chaos Has Senators Fleeing to Idaho and a
Militia Threatening the Capitol, SLATE (June 24, 2019, 6:30 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/06/oregon-legislature-climate-change-bill-chaos.html.
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indeterminacy of Article V could leave open a relatively easy path
toward repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment.
III. WHO SHOULDDECIDE IF A STATE RATIFICATION IS VALID?
Just because we have little guidance on how to determine if a
state’s ratification or rescission is valid does not mean we are com-
pletely lost if we could feel comfortable knowing that there was a
competent body to settle any disputes based on a commitment of
creating clear, universal standards. But sadly, we do not have even
that shaky ground to stand on. Should the state courts decide be-
cause ratification procedures are creatures of state law, or should
the federal courts decide since ratification is a federal constitutional
function? Should Congress decide because these are non-justiciable
political questions, or should the National Archivist decide as the
executive agent charged with publishing an amendment? As one
can see, if we do not have clear rules on what constitutes ratification
and what body (the state courts, federal courts, Congress, the Ar-
chivist) can confirm compliance, there is virtually no guidance on
the very real and present question of whether states can rescind
their ratifications of the ERA. For instance, if rescissions are per-
missible, how do we know if rescissions have to be by the same pro-
cess as ratification, for Idaho attempted to rescind the ERA through
a simple majority vote, even though Idaho legislative rules required
a super-majority to ratify.75 And the acting Kentucky governor ve-
toed Kentucky’s rescission even though governors usually do not
play a role in amendment ratifications.76 Unlike the hypotheticals
explored in the discussion above, like the popular mandate or the
governor’s executive order, states have attempted to rescind their
ratifications after submitting certificates of ratification to the Sec-
retary of State, and they have ratified after rejecting an amend-
ment. And although the courts have addressed the latter,77 they
have so far dodged the question on rescissions, even though the first
rescission arguably occurred over a century and a half ago.
75. When Idaho decided to rescind its ratification of the ERA, Senator EdithMiller Klein,
chair of the Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee, determined that rescission would require
a two-thirds vote. But that decision was overruled by the full Senate, which ultimately voted
to rescind on an 18-17 vote. See Betsy Z. Russel, Idaho’s Role in the Equal Rights Amendment
Ratification Saga, KTVB (Dec. 17, 2019, 11:11 AM), https://www.ktvb.com/article/
news/politics/idaho-equal-rights-amendment-history/277-99a830f9-fc5f-4697-b7c4-c2632af
2e8ab; see also Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981).
76. See Taylor, supra note 40.
77. As discussed below, the Court has held that ratification after rejection is valid. See
discussion infra notes 126 127 and accompanying text.
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Eventually someone will need to decide if rescissions are effective,
and the ERA is directly posing that issue.
The vagueness of the constitutional process and the importance
of the outcome make it highly inappropriate for the National Archi-
vist to rule on the legal sufficiency of any state’s ratification.78 If
anything, it would seem that determining the legal sufficiency of a
state’s ratification should fall either to the state’s own judiciary or
the federal courts.79 Yet because state legislatures are engaging in
a federal constitutional function when they ratify an amendment,
the federal courts would seem to be the most logical body to deter-
mine if a state’s ratification complies with Article V.80 But given
that the constitution grants to the state legislatures the power to
ratify, and presumably the power to determine the process for rati-
fication, it truly is an open question whether ratification challenges
should be decided by the state or the federal courts.
For reasons discussed much more thoroughly in other scholar-
ship, Congress is also a problematic option.81 It would be like put-
ting the fox to guard the henhouse to give Congress the power to
determine the boundaries between Congressional and State-
granted functions under Article V, as would be the case with the
seven-year deadline. But even in the matter of balancing the power
of the states vis-à-vis each other, Congress is a political body, and
the ratification function arguably should be standardized. Judge
78. United States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Stahl, 792 F.2d
1438 (9th Cir. 1986); U.S. ex rel. Widenmann v. Colby, 265 F. 998, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1920); see
also Congressional Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85 (1992).
79. However, in at least one instance, the Supreme Court refused to defer to the state’s
highest court when it had ruled that a post-ratification public referendum was valid, and in
another the Court declined to intervene and instead held the certificate to be conclusive de-
spite a state court determination that the ratification was invalid. In Chandler v. Wise, the
Court accepted the state’s ratification certificate as conclusive, as it did in Leser v. Garnett.
307 U.S. 474, 477 (1939); 258 U.S. 130 (1922). In Chandler v. Wise the Court did not engage
the substantive issue of post-rejection ratification on the merits, as had the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, but instead dismissed the grant of certiorari on the grounds that the governor
had already submitted the certificate of ratification to the Secretary of State and the issue
was therefore moot. Chandler, 307 U.S. at 474. But in Hawke v. Smith, the Court did not
defer to the Ohio Supreme Court’s determination that a public referendum did not violate
Article V procedures. 126 N.E. 400 (Ohio 1919), rev’d, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
80. Numerous courts have held that states are engaging in a federal function when they
ratify an amendment proposal. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230; Leser, 258 U.S. at 136–37; Dyer
v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575, 578
(M.D. Fla. 1973).
81. See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 32, at 411–17; William L. Dunker, Constitutional
Amendments—The Justiciability of Ratification and Retraction, 41 TENN. L. REV. 93 (1973);
Judith L. Elder, Article V, Justiciability, and the Equal Rights Amendment, 31 OKLA. L. REV.
63, 90 (1978); Marty Haddad, Substantive Content of Constitutional Amendments: Political
Question or Justiciable Concern?, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1685 (1996); Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra
note 47, at 144–59; Michael Stokes Paulsen, AGeneral Theory of Article V: The Constitutional
Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 706–21 (1993).
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Stevens rejected the political question doctrine in Dyer v. Blair,
stating that “[w]e are persuaded that the word ‘ratification[’] as
used in article V of the federal Constitution must be interpreted
with the kind of consistency that is characteristic of judicial, as op-
posed to political, decision making.”82 With his inimitable opti-
mism, he offers some hope for those seeking an escape from the Ar-
ticle V morass. He reminds us that “[t]he mere fact that a court has
little or nothing but the language of the Constitution as a guide to
its interpretation does not mean that the task of construction is ju-
dicially unmanageable.”83
So even though federal precedent is vague and indeterminate, we
should examine the arguments a court would likely use to deter-
mine if a state may rescind its ratification under Article V. And
that means that we should look to the function of ratification as a
process of constitution-making to guide us, remembering that the
constitution establishes a federation of states as independent sov-
ereignties. As Hajdu and Rosenblum explain, Article V’s delegation
of the ratification function to the several states implies that each
should operate independently of the others:
While article V implicitly denies a state legislature any power
to interfere with the overall process of ratification, it also as-
signs to that body a specific constitutional function—the act of
ratification. The extent to which this assignment to the state
legislature is exclusive—prohibiting interference either by
Congress or by the state itself—remains unclear. An analysis
of the state’s role in the amending process indicates, however,
that the balance between state and federal powers in the
amending process, the “federal function” of the state legisla-
tures, and the role of the legislatures as the voices of the states
can best be effectuated if Congress has no power to control the
act of ratification, and if the power of the states is limited to
matters of procedure rather than matters of substance.84
Now that we have a better understanding of the complexity in-
herent in the question of who gets to decide the legal sufficiency of
state ratifications, and on what criteria, we can finally consider the
validity of state rescissions. In order to guide us toward a rational
determination of whether Article V allows states to rescind, we
should examine the original understanding of the ratification
82. 390 F. Supp. at 1303.
83. Id. at 1302.
84. Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra note 47, at 113.
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process and prior precedents in light of the essential function of rat-
ification intrinsic to the making of a constitution.
IV. SHOULD STATES BE ABLE TO CHANGE THEIRMINDS IN THE
RATIFICATION PROCESS?
It is tempting to view changes to state ratifications as equivalent,
so that a post-rejection ratification is equivalent to a post-ratifica-
tion rescission, but that symmetry is problematic for many reasons.
It is problematic because ratification is a process of transition from
operating under no legal duty to accepting a legally binding obliga-
tion. If one is not legally bound to protect equal rights, then reject-
ing the obligation is merely a continuation of one’s original position.
Choosing to be bound by the legal obligation is the act that changes
the status quo. Rejecting the change has no legal significance. The
same is true with constitutional amendments, as we saw with Pro-
hibition, which required a second amendment to void the effects of
the first bad decision. The very existence of the amendment power,
which creates a process for fixing bad decisions, is evidence that the
process must be started all over again if the first is to be undone.85
Lessons can be learned from the Eighteenth Amendment, in which
there were unsuccessful legal challenges, attempts to simply ignore
the Amendment’s requirements, and legislative efforts to under-
mine it that were all unsuccessful, leading to a push for repeal
through another amendment.86
A. Evidence from Original Intent
When the drafters discussed whether the Constitution would in-
clude a provision for amendments, they were clear that the unanim-
ity requirement for amendment under the Articles of Confederation
was the single greatest hurdle to success of the new republic.87
Thus, Article V was drafted to require only a two-thirds majority of
Congress to make proposals, with a three-fourths majority of the
states needed to ratify.88 This ensured that constitutional changes
85. The Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment after much dis-
cussion and litigation over the best way to minimize the effects of Prohibition. See KYVIG,
supra note 11, at 275 88.
86. See id. at 249 51, 295.
87. Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitu-
tional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 144 (1996) (“Article V was a reaction to the rigid
unanimity requirement of Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation. In Madison’s lan-
guage, Article XIII resulted in ‘the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the
perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth’ . . . .”).
88. U.S. CONST. art V.
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were supported by significant majorities of law-makers and the
public, but that ratifying an amendment was not a virtual impossi-
bility and would not force us toward revolution.
During the drafting, James Madison made it clear that states
could not condition their ratification of the Constitution on the ac-
tions of other states or retain the power to withdraw their ratifica-
tion. In discussing whether New York could conditionally ratify the
new constitution, he explained:
[m]y opinion is that a reservation of a right to withdraw if
amendments be not decided on under the form of the Constitu-
tion within a certain time, is a conditional ratification, that it
does not make N. York a member of the New Union, and con-
sequently that she could not be received on that plan. Com-
pacts must be reciprocal, this principle would not in such a case
be preserved. The Constitution requires an adoption in toto,
and for ever [sic]. It has been so adopted by the other States.
An adoption for a limited time would be as defective as an adop-
tion of some of the articles only.89
To get the new constitution ratified, Madison realized it was fun-
damentally important that states not be given the power to condi-
tion their ratifications on the actions of other states or on inclusion
of a bill of rights; ratification needed to provide certainty for subse-
quent states engaging in the deeply consequential process of adopt-
ing a new constitution. Because ratification is the only legally ef-
fective act recognized in Article V, implying a power to rescind
would seem to go against the principles of constitutionalism by un-
dermining the methodical step-by-step process of achieving consen-
sus. The framers viewed ratification of the Constitution as a sim-
ple, unconditional acceptance with no take-backs, and there is no
evidence that they wanted to treat amendments differently.
This need for certainty is perhaps even more important today
than it was in 1787, as the number of states and their populations
and political views are more diverse. With greater political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural pressures facing state legislatures, they
need to feel confident about the status of an amendment proposal
before they expend the political capital and scarce legislative time
to consider ratifying a proposed amendment. If a state legislature
believes that its ratification effort will put an amendment over the
line, it would be intolerable if an earlier ratifying state could rescind
89. Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (July 20, 1788) (on file with the
National Historical Publications and Records Commission).
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just as another state’s legislature is involved in the complex politics
of ratifying. For what state legislature would expend the political
resources to ratify if it could not rely on the stability of earlier rati-
fications? And what state would ratify a constitution containing an
amendment procedure that would allow for ever-fluctuating posi-
tions on constitutional structures and procedures?
Richard Bernstein and Jerome Agel explain:
the prevailing view is that the amending process may be un-
derstood as working in only one direction. Once a state rejects
an amendment, it is free to reconsider and ratify it; however,
once a state ratifies an amendment, it may not rescind that
ratification. Why should this be the case? A state’s decision to
adopt an amendment forms the basis for later states’ decisions
to adopt or to reject. To permit rescission of a ratification would
be to confuse and perhaps derail the amending process’s or-
derly functioning. By contrast, if a state reconsiders its rejec-
tion of an amendment, its action does not undercut the basis
for later states’ decisions. A state should be free to change its
mind about rejecting an amendment if other states’ actions
demonstrate that the amendment has general popular sup-
port.90
Like the conditional ratifications of the Constitution that the
framers expressly rejected, rescissions undermine the amendment
process by breeding greater uncertainty and making the process
more susceptible to changing political winds. It would also make
amendments more difficult. Members of Congress know that sanc-
tioning rescissions destabilizes the amendment process.91 Conse-
quently, legislative efforts to recognize rescissions have been of-
fered only by Congressmen who opposed particular amendments;
allowing rescissions has never been supported by amendment pro-
ponents.
90. BERNSTEIN WITH AGEL, supra note 32, at 254.
91. One obvious reason for the rejection by Congress of efforts to permit rescission by the
states is the uncertainty that it would inject into an otherwise relatively straight-forward
process. Congressmen quickly criticized the Wadsworth-Garrett resolution to allow rescis-
sions as creating additional uncertainty, “because any intervening election or new political
and social conditions could cause the legislature to retract its vote either to ratify or reject
an amendment proposal.” RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: MAKING,
BREAKING, AND CHANGING CONSTITUTIONS 122 (2019); see also Justin Miller, Amendment of
the Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made More Difficult?, 10 MINN. L. REV. 185 (1926)
(exploring the history and implications of the Wadsworth-Garrett proposal, noting that it
would make amendment much more difficult for many of the reasons stated here).
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As with legislation that, in hindsight, proves unworkable, consti-
tutional amendments too are not etched in stone. When the great
Prohibition experiment proved a failure, the Twenty-First Amend-
ment solved the problem, being one of the quickest to be ratified, in
under ten months. Because there is a viable process for when states
change their minds, and because allowing rescissions can destabi-
lize the amendment process, there seems to be no clear justification
for implying a power to rescind in Article V.
B. Prior Precedents Have Consistently Rejected Rescissions
Numerous times Congress has faced attempted rescissions by
states, and it has introduced legislative proposals to give legal effect
to rescissions, and all have been rejected. States purported to re-
scind their ratifications of the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth, and the
Nineteenth Amendments and all were rejected by Congress.92 Alt-
hough acceptance by Congress is not relevant under the Article V
process,93 and ultimately enough states ratified all three amend-
ments that counting the rescinding states was unnecessary, the
precedent is instructive. The fact that the Secretary of State
counted the rescinding states in the number of ratifying states, and
then Congress subsequently rejected legislation and amendment
proposals to recognize rescissions, shows that the prevailing Con-
gressional consensus over a century and a half is that rescissions
are ineffective.94
When the Fourteenth Amendment was close to ratification, New
Jersey and Ohio ratified the amendment and later passed resolu-
tions attempting to rescind their approval of the amendment.95
Nonetheless, the Fourteenth Amendment was certified by the Sec-
retary of State as valid, including Ohio and New Jersey as ratifying
states, essentially ignoring their rescissions. Congress later af-
firmed by joint resolution the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and included in its resolution that Ohio and New Jersey had
ratified.96 As David Kyvig concluded, Congress took the position
that “[c]onstitutional amendment was a specific procedure, not an
ordinary legislative process, and therefore conventional practices of
92. And unfortunately, the issues were not litigated because they ultimately became
moot when additional states ratified all of these amendments. Harmon, supra note 27.
93. See Congressional Pay Amendment, supra note 78.
94. Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra note 47, at 119.
95. KYVIG, supra note 11, at 174 75.
96. Id. at 175. Although additional states ratified before Congress passed its resolution,
making the issue moot, Congress still listed the rescinding states as ratifying states of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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reconsideration did not apply.”97 Congress’s actions during the rat-
ification of the Fourteenth Amendment are consistent with the De-
partment of Justice’s point of view, expressed in testimony on the
ERA extension, that ratification is the only action a state can take
on a constitutional amendment.98
When New York attempted to rescind its ratification of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, Congress again refused to recognize the rescis-
sion and New York was listed as a ratifying state.99 Although Con-
gress did not formally recognize passage of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, as it was proclaimed effective by the Secretary of State before
Congress could act, New York was included in the list of ratifying
states in a joint resolution drafted to declare its passage.100 Simi-
larly, Tennessee attempted to rescind the Nineteenth Amendment
but Secretary of State Colby promulgated it with no question di-
rected to Congress as to the validity of Tennessee’s ratification, and
the list of ratifying states included Tennessee.101 Judge Jameson,
in 1887, explained the prevailing view:
The power of a State legislature to participate in amending the
Federal Constitution exists only by virtue of a special grant in
the Constitution. . . . So, when the State legislature has done
the act or thing which the power contemplated and author-
ized—when the power [to ratify] has been exercised—it, ipso
facto, ceases to exist . . . .102
Congress has consistently and uniformly viewed the right of
states to rescind as unavailing, which is remarkable given Con-
gress’ political character and shifting interests. Senator Roscoe
Conkling in 1870 opined that rescissions after ratification were im-
permissible.103 A century later, discussing the DC Representation
Amendment, so too did Representative Harold Volkmer.104 That
97. Id.
98. See H.R REP. NO. 95-1405, at 12–16 (1978); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEX. L. REV. 919, 939 n.122 (1979) (citing
Equal Rights Amendment Extension: Hearings on H.J. Res. 638 Before the Subcomm. on Civ.
& Const. Rts of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. at 121 57 (1977)).
99. H.R REP. NO. 95-1405, at 21 (1978).
100. Leo Kanowitz & Marilyn Klinger, Can a State Rescind Its Equal Rights Amendment
Ratification: Who Decides and How?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 999 n.116 (1977); Notice by the
Secretary of State Regarding Constitutional Amendment, Pub. L. No. 15-346, 16 Stat. 1131.
101. 16 Stat. 1131; Notice by the Secretary of State Regarding Constitutional Amend-
ment, 41 Stat. 1823.
102. JOHN A. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR HISTORY,
POWERS, ANDMODES OF PROCEEDING 631 32 (1887).
103. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1477 (1870).
104. 124 CONG. REC. 5270 (1978).
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rescissions are quintessentially political statements intended to im-
press constituents rather than effect constitutional change can be
seen in the case of Oregon. Oregon ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in September 1866, then it withdrew its ratification in Octo-
ber of 1868 after the Amendment had reached its constitutional ma-
jority.105 Oregon clearly understood that once the Amendment had
been declared ratified, its rescission could have no legal effect. Or-
egon then re-ratified in April of 1973. As scholars have noted, the
symbolism of late ratifications of the Reconstruction and Suffrage
Amendments is important, even if they have no legal signifi-
cance.106 Oregon’s rescission after the amendment was ratified
clearly functioned as symbolism, not constitutionalism.
The fact that rescissions have been consistently deemed ineffec-
tive does not mean that politicians from different political parties
have not tried to encourage them or give them legal effect. How-
ever, all legislative and amendment efforts to permit state rescis-
sions have also failed. When Senator James Wadsworth of New
York and Representative Finis Garrett of Tennessee proposed an
amendment to Article V in 1921 that would allow states to rescind,
they did so as part of an effort to make constitutional amendments
even more difficult during the constitutional panic of the early
1920s.107 Their colleagues quickly saw that they were trying to im-
pose greater barriers on amendments by allowing states to destabi-
lize the ratification process through rescissions.108 Congressman
Garrett stated that “it is generally regarded to be—the law that a
State . . . may not reconsider and change a ratification.”109 And a
Senate Report of 1973 concluded that “Congress previously has
taken the position that having once ratified an amendment, a State
may not rescind.”110 Wadsworth and Garrett’s bill failed.
In response to the ERA, Senator Sam Ervin, a staunch opponent,
proposed legislation in Congress that would have allowed states to
rescind; it too was rejected. Called “a thoroughly misconceived
105. GOV’T PUBL’G OFF., AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 30 n.6 (1992), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/pdf/GPO-
CONAN-1992-7.pdf.
106. SeeGabriel J. Chin & Anjali Abraham,Beyond the Supermajority: Post-Adoption Rat-
ification of the Equality Amendments, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 37 (2008).
107. KYVIG, supra note 11, at 251 53. The Wadsworth-Garrett bill would have slowed
ratification by requiring an intervening election of state legislators, that ratifications be sub-
ject to popular referendum, and that states could rescind until three-fourths of states had
un-rescinded ratifications.
108. Id.
109. 66 CONG. REC. 2159 (1925) (remarks of Rep. Garrett).
110. S. REP. NO. 93-293, at 14 (1973).
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piece of legislation,”111 Ervin’s bill included a provision that would
allow a state to rescind, along with other barriers to amendment,
such as an automatic seven-year deadline, and that Congress has
the authority to adjudge the legal sufficiency of all ratifications that
shall be binding on the courts.112 And Ervin’s was not the only bill
introduced to allow rescissions during the ERA extension de-
bates.113 All ultimately failed, in part because adding barriers to an
already difficult process was seen by members of Congress as de-
stabilizing, and arguably unconstitutional.
Assuming the silence in Article V means the power to rescind was
not granted to the states, legislation to permit rescissions would
constitute an unauthorized amendment to the constitution, and leg-
islation to prohibit them would be irrelevant and ineffective.114 In
either situation, Congressional legislation runs up against the
stone wall that is Article V. Because the Article V procedures are
self-executing—amendments become effective immediately upon
ratification by the last state115—there is no need for enabling legis-
lation and no role for Congress to proclaim or actualize an amend-
ment. Unlike Dr. Frankenstein’s creation, whose electric sparks
gave him life, a constitutional amendment takes life gradually with
each subsequent ratification. Congress may have the power to ini-
tiate a constitutional amendment, but it is the states that do the
heavy lifting to give it life. Because the states are the most im-
portant actors in the Article V process, it makes sense that Con-
gress can neither legislate Article V procedures, nor permit states
to destabilize the constitutional functions of the other states by re-
scinding and throwing the amendment process into uncertainty.
Furthermore, if states wish the power to rescind, they certainly
111. Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE
L.J. 189, 190 (1972).
112. S. 215, 92d Cong. (1971).
113. 124 CONG. REC. 26, 257–58 (1978) (rejection of Railsback Amendment); 124 CONG.
REC. 33,174 (1978) (rejection of amendment No. 3674 allowing for a State legislature to re-
scind a ratification of the ERA); see also 124 CONG. REC. 33,366 (1978).
114. If one assumes that Article V currently permits rescissions, the same logic applies.
Legislation cannot prohibit them as that would be superseding a Constitutional provision,
and legislation permitting them would be ineffective. Noted scholars have also concluded
that Congress has no authority to legislate such procedural matters around Article V. Lester
Orfield, in 1942, admonished: “The constitutionality of Congressional regulation would seem
exceedingly doubtful. The states cannot be coerced into adopting an amendment. . . . Con-
gress has done its work when it proposes [the amendment and the mode of ratification], and
the matter of adoption is for the states.” ORFIELD, supra note 63, at 64 65; see also Corwin
& Ramsey, supra note 64, at 208.
115. The Supreme Court in Dillon v. Gloss held that the Eighteenth Amendment became
effective the day of the last required ratification and that, consequently, a statute passed
pursuant to the Amendment was valid to convict the defendant. 256 U.S. 368, 376 77 (1921).
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have a mechanism to attain that end: a constitutional amendment
clarifying and/or adjusting Article V procedures.116
C. Judicial Precedent
Judicial precedent can also be instructive as we try to forge a path
to a logical conclusion on state rescissions despite what little of it
being irritatingly off point. In 1939, the Supreme Court handed
down two Article V decisions in cases dealing with states that
changed their minds, but these involved ratifications after rejec-
tions: Coleman v. Miller and Chandler v. Wise.117 In 1981, the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Idaho ruled that Idaho could rescind
its ratification of the ERA, but that decision was vacated by the Su-
preme Court.118 State court opinions have opined that rescissions
are ineffective, but of course they are not binding on the federal
courts. And various attorneys general have expressed their views
that rescissions are ineffective, but they are merely opinions based
on the same handful of enigmatic cases. In all, the paucity of cases
leaves us trying to find the best path forward on this important con-
stitutional question with little guidance.
In both Supreme Court cases dealing with post-rejection ratifica-
tions, the Court upheld the states’ ratifications against allegations
of legal insufficiency, although only one decision included a discus-
sion somewhat on the merits.119 In Coleman, the Court upheld the
Kansas post-rejection ratification of the Child Labor Amendment,
but it could not agree and therefore failed to decide whether the
lieutenant governor’s vote broke either state or federal law. The
Court in Coleman held that a state could change its mind and ratify
after having rejected an amendment proposal and that ratification
would be valid once a certificate of ratification was sent to Wash-
ington. The Kansas Supreme Court had upheld the post-rejection
ratification on the grounds that the technical language of Article V
speaks only of ratifications and that a rejection was not such an act
116. See Michael C. Hanlon, The Need for a General Time Limit on Ratification of Pro-
posed Constitutional Amendments, 16 J. L. & POL. 663 (2000).
117. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939).
118. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated sub nom. Nat’l Org.
for Women v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982) (mem.).
119. In Coleman v. Miller, the lieutenant governor broke a tie vote in the Kansas Senate
and the Kansas Supreme Court had ruled that the action did not nullify the ratification. 71
P.2d 518 (Kan. 1937), rev’d, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). In Wise v. Chandler, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals had held that Kentucky was precluded from ratifying after it had previously re-
jected an amendment proposal, expressly adopting the theory that states could only vote
once. 108 S.W.2d 1024 (Ky. Ct. App. 1937).
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as to preclude future ratifications under Article V.120 On appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed, but merely on the technical grounds
that Kansas’ ratification satisfied the clear language of Article V.121
The Court did not endorse any particular theory of Article V, nor
did it presage how it might rule if Congress were to legislate on the
matter.122 In the absence of any real controversy, the Court con-
cluded that Kansas’ ratification met the technical requirements of
Article V, and it would not upset that technical compliance without
some reason other than the fact that the Kansas legislators who
brought suit were unhappy that they did not have the votes to block
it.
In Chandler v. Wise, the Court reversed a Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals decision striking its post-rejection ratification of the Child La-
bor Amendment.123 That court determined that a state may only
act once in response to an amendment proposal and could not
change its mind, in either direction.124 Based on the technical lan-
guage of Article V and its prior decision in Coleman, the Supreme
Court reversed and otherwise dismissed the case in Chandler on
mootness grounds, stating that the Kentucky certification of ratifi-
cation was conclusive on the courts.125
These two cases, standing together, resolved the split in the
states as to whether states could ratify after rejecting, which the
Court affirmed on the basis of a technical reading of the plain lan-
guage of Article V that speaks only of ratification as a constitutional
act. The decisions also affirmed decades of prior practice, from the
Twelfth to the Twenty-Seventh Amendments.126 In 1870, New York
120. Coleman, 71 P.2d at 518.
121. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433.
122. “Article V, speaking solely of ratification, contains no provision as to rejection. Nor
has the Congress enacted a statute relating to rejections.” Id. at 450.
123. Wise v. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d 1024 (Ky. Ct. App. 1937), rev’d, Chandler v. Wise, 307
U.S. 474 (1939).
124. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d at 1033.
125. Chandler, 307 U.S. at 477.
126. Massachusetts ratified the Twelfth Amendment after having previously rejected it.
New Jersey, Delaware, Kentucky, and Mississippi ratified the Thirteenth after having pre-
viously rejected it. North Carolina, Louisiana, South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, Texas,
Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky ratified the Fourteenth after rejection. Ohio, New Jer-
sey, Delaware, Oregon, California, Maryland, Kentucky, and Tennessee ratified the Fif-
teenth after rejection. Arkansas and New Hampshire ratified the Sixteenth after rejection.
Delaware ratified the Seventeenth after rejection. Alabama, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, and South Carolina ratified the Nineteenth after rejection.
And New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island ratified the Twenty-Seventh after re-
jection. Of course, many of these later ratifications were after the decision in Coleman af-
firming the power of states to ratify after rejection. A list of all state ratifications with their
dates is available. See DAVID C. HUCKABEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-922 GOV, RATIFICATION
OF AMENDMENTS TO THEU.S. CONSTITUTION 5 (1997).
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re-ratified the Fifteenth Amendment after having ratified and re-
scinded. All states that have ratified after rejection, whether before
1939 or after, are considered as ratifying states, regardless of their
intervening attempts to rescind.127 Although the Supreme Court
has not expressly done so, it would seem that it has rejected the
claim that states may not change their minds once they have taken
a vote on an amendment proposal, even though the decision in
Chandler was based on mootness and the decision in Coleman was
based on some vague, ill-defined attempt to decide the case without
actually setting a precedent.128 But the precedents only support the
power of the states to change their minds in one direction, to ratify
after prior rejection, a position that aligns with a technical reading
of Article V, and say nothing about the power of states to rescind
after their ratification certificates have been sent to Washington.
One court did rule on the legality of a post-ratification rejection,
however, but like so many Article V cases is problematic on numer-
ous levels.129 The opinion reeks of partisanship and uses a ques-
tionable reading of Chandler and Coleman to conclude that rescis-
sions are permissible, despite over a century of historical rejection.
Idaho, following its rescission of the ERA in 1977, brought suit in
the District Court of Idaho seeking a declaratory judgment that its
rescission was valid.130 After a long and contested process, Judge
Callister issued an opinion in 1981 upholding the rescission even
though the issue was arguably unripe as the ERA had not otherwise
been ratified by the requisite number of states.131 On appeal, the
Supreme Court vacated the decision when it granted certiorari, but
then dismissed the case entirely on mootness grounds because the
extended ERA deadline had passed with no additional ratifica-
tions.132
In his deliberations on the issue of rescission, Judge Callister con-
cluded that the Supreme Court’s acceptance of post-rejection ratifi-
cations in Chandler and Coleman implied that states could change
127. Oregon, Ohio, and New Jersey all re-ratified the Fourteenth Amendment after hav-
ing purportedly rescinded.
128. The Court in Coleman was deeply divided. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939). Four justices voted to dismiss on the grounds that all Article V issues are non-justi-
ciable political questions. Id. at 456. Two justices voted to address the issues on the merits
and would have voided Kansas’ ratification as being stale. Id. at 470. Three justices, includ-
ing Chief Justice Hughes, voted to address the issues on the merits but upheld the Kansas
ratification. Id. at 435. This meant there were five votes for justiciability and seven votes to
uphold the ratification, but no majority on any theory for upholding the ratification.
129. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981).
130. Id. at 1114.
131. Id. at 1154–55.
132. Nat’l Org. for Women v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982) (mem.).
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their minds and rescind after ratifying, despite the fact that neither
precedent involved that issue.133 Judge Callister concluded that the
Supreme Court in Chandler and Coleman had rejected prior theo-
ries of Article V, either that states could only vote once, or could
only vote one-way to ratify.134 From that, he concluded that the
Court must have, sub silentio, determined that states could change
their minds to rescind as well as to ratify.135
This conclusion is problematic for a number of reasons. First,
Coleman did not involve a rescission after ratification; thus, the di-
rect question was not before the Court, so it was not argued or
briefed. Second, the Court’s purported rejection of the reasoning of
the Kansas Supreme Court was not based on any discussion of the
reasoning or discussion of any theory of Article V. Rather, the Court
based its decision on different grounds, concluding that if Congress
had not acted to resolve the uncertainty of whether states can
change their minds, the Court would not legislate from the bench
on the subject. The split on the Court also makes drawing conclu-
sions difficult, as four justices voted to treat the issues as non-jus-
ticiable political questions, two voted to reach the merits and rule
against the Kansas ratification, and three voted to reach the merits
and uphold the ratification. One cannot conclude from this that the
Court had implicitly adopted an interpretation of Article V that
states can rescind when it was not discussed and was not an issue
in either the lower decision or the final one.136
Judge Callister’s reasoning from Chandler v. Wise137 is even more
problematic. In Chandler, the Court reversed Kentucky’s finding
that the post-rejection ratification was invalid on the same grounds
as in Coleman, and then it dismissed the case as moot since Ken-
tucky had already sent its certificate of ratification to Washing-
ton.138 Judge Callister concluded, however, that the dismissal on
133. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. at 1146–50.
134. Id. at 1147.
135. Id. (“[T]hey found ‘no reason for disturbing the decision of the Supreme Court of Kan-
sas . . . its judgment is affirmed but upon the grounds stated in this opinion.’ . . . Thus they
rejected the approach of the Kansas court and chose to base their decision on other criteria.”)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). That other criteria, however, was that Congress
had failed to legislate on the subject. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939). Hold-
ing that they would not intervene to establish a rule in the absence of Congressional action
is a far cry from affirmatively rejecting any theory of Article V.
136. This is like the Court dismissing a breach of contract case on the lack of a contract,
which means it does not have to get to the issue of whether a breach did or did not occur.
Because the Court based its decision on different grounds, it did not expressly reject or accept
the reasoning of the Kentucky Supreme Court.
137. 307 U.S. 474 (1939).
138. Id. at 477–78.
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mootness grounds implied a rejection of the theory that states could
not change their minds either way on ratification decisions.139
By a process of elimination, Judge Callister concluded that the
Supreme Court must have implicitly adopted the position that
states could rescind, despite over a century of prior history conclud-
ing that rescissions were ineffective.140 Given that the Supreme
Court has never addressed rescissions, that Coleman and Chandler
stand only for the proposition that a technical reading of Article V
allows states to ratify after rejection, and that the question was un-
ripe in the context of the ERA, Callister’s reasoning is quite per-
plexing. We do not know how the Court planned to respond to
Judge Callister’s conclusion that rescissions are suddenly permissi-
ble because, although the Court granted certiorari, it ultimately va-
cated the decision and then dismissed the appeal on mootness
grounds.
While there is no clear federal judicial precedent on how to han-
dle purported rescissions of a constitutional amendment, state prec-
edents can be instructive.141 Governor Ward of New Jersey vetoed
the New Jersey rescission of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
grounds that “New Jersey’s initial 1867 endorsement had com-
pleted the amending process and bound the state to a federal con-
tract.”142 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine came to the same
conclusion that rescissions are impermissible in an opinion issued
responding to a question by the Governor in 1919 regarding the
Eighteenth Amendment.143 When Kentucky’s legislature brought a
resolution to rescind its prior ratification of the ERA, the Lieuten-
ant Governor, Thelma Stovall, vetoed the resolution, stating the re-
scission was invalid because once a legislature has voted to ratify
139. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. at 1147.
140. Id. at 1149–50.
141. Ginsburg, supra note 98, at 939 n.122 (first citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-1405, at 12 16
(1978) (testifying that rescissions are impermissible); and then citing Equal Rights Amend-
ment Extension: Hearings on H.J. Res. 638 Before the Subcomm. on Civ. & Const. Rts. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. at 121 57 (1977) (Harmon Memo and
Testimony)).
142. KYVIG, supra note 11, at 174.
143. In re Op. of the Justices, 107 A. 673, 674 (Me. 1919) (“Here, again, the state Legisla-
ture in ratifying the amendment, as Congress in proposing it, is not, strictly speaking, acting
in the discharge of legislative duties and functions as a law-making body, but is acting in
behalf of and as representative of the people as a ratifying body, under the power expressly
conferred upon it by Article 5. The people, through their Constitution, might have clothed
the Senate alone, or the House alone, or the Governor’s Council, or the Governor, with the
power of ratification, or might have reserved that power to themselves to be exercised by
popular vote. But they did not. They retained no power of ratification in themselves, but
conferred it completely upon the two houses of the Legislature; that is, the Legislative As-
sembly.”).
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an amendment, its constitutional act is final.144 The Kentucky de-
cision follows the longstanding precedent set when, a century ear-
lier, the Kentucky Governor had also determined that rescissions
were impermissible.145 Later, the Kentucky Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of Kansas also implicitly rejected the validity of
rescission after ratification.146 Moreover, the Department of Justice
recognized that ratification is “an act that cannot be accompanied
by strings or conditions, a final act that cannot be withdrawn.”147
Furthermore, it is notable that there are other situations in
which states have not been allowed to rescind after they have
agreed to participate in other multi-state activities, as in multi-
state compacts. For instance, inWest Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims,
West Virginia was not allowed to withdraw from a pollution control
contract for the Ohio River.148 The Court held that since Congress
must agree to all interstate compacts, and they are justiciable in
the federal courts, provisions in West Virginia’s Constitution pro-
hibiting the compact were superseded.149 A similar outcome oc-
curred in Nebraska v. Iowa, with the Supreme Court retaining ju-
risdiction to determine the validity of interstate compacts, and nul-
lifying state law conflicts.150 Similarly, in the context of Indian af-
fairs, where the federal government has superior authority, the
courts have held that actions by states are final, even if they contain
irregularities, and that the states cannot change their minds.151 As
one commentator noted:
[t]he compact and state resolution situations indicate that
withdrawal by a state from a previous commitment has often
been denied by the courts. The amending of the United States
Constitution is a function in which the federal government ex-
ercises more control over the states than either the compact or
resolution situations and, therefore, state procedural
144. Taylor, supra note 40.
145. See JAMESON, supra note 102, at 630 (quoting the message of Governor Bramlette).
146. Wise v. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d 1024, 1033 (Ky. Ct. App. 1937) (“[A] State can act but
once . . . upon a proposed amendment; and, whether its vote be in the affirmative or be neg-
ative, having acted, it has exhausted its power further to consider the question without a
resubmission by Congress.”); Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518, 524 (Kan. 1937) (“[A] ratifica-
tion once given cannot be withdrawn.”).
147. Ginsburg, supra note 98, at 939; See Power of a State Legislature to Rescind Its Rat-
ification of a Constitutional Amendment, 1 Op. O.L.C. 13, 13–15 (1977).
148. 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
149. Id. at 30–32.
150. 406 U.S. 117 (1972).
151. See United States v. Brown, 334 F. Supp. 536 (D. Neb. 1971); Omaha Tribe of Neb.
v. Vill. of Walthill, 334 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1971).
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irregularities would seem even less of a reason to allow rescis-
sion in that area.152
In the end, however, there is no precedent stating that states may
not rescind, Article V is silent on the issue, and although no state’s
rescission has ever been recognized, that fact did not matter be-
cause additional ratifications made up the difference. The courts
dealing with the ERA’s validation are likely to have to resolve this
thorny question, as it is unlikely that an additional five states will
ratify in the near future. If prior precedent is insufficient to con-
vince a court of the invalidity of the rescissions, then we generally
turn to policy and canons of construction to fill in the details that
James Madison left in Article V.
V. OUT OF THE RABBITHOLE: THEORIES OF RESCISSION AND
RATIFICATION
In considering whether states should be allowed to rescind their
prior ratifications of the ERA, it seems courts should focus on the
function of ratification in our constitutional system and the rela-
tionship of states to each other. Like legislation, ratification is an
affirmative decision by a representative body to adopt a rule that
becomes legally binding once the requisite number of states have
ratified. As with all legislation, the process takes time and each
state’s ratification can be seen as one step in a multi-step process.
The ultimate question, therefore, is whether the Article V ratifica-
tion process is a single ticket to ride, a one-way escalator, or thirty-
eight separate elevators leading to a single destination.
Commentators analyzing the issue of post-rejection ratification
and post-ratification rescission have identified three general theo-
ries for analyzing the ratification power.153 The first is that states
may only act once, either by rejection or by ratification and, once
they have taken that step, their decision is binding and may not be
revisited.154 This is the one-bite-at-the-apple theory, which is based
primarily on the convention mode rather than the legislative mode,
for once a convention has been dismissed, it is not reassembled and
is unable to revisit the matters for which it was assembled.155 Rat-
ification under this model would be like having one ticket to ride at
Disneyland. You can use it to go up Space Mountain, or you can use
152. Raymond M. Planell, The Equal Rights Amendment: Will States Be Allowed to
Change Their Minds?, 49 NOTREDAME L. REV. 657, 661 (1974).
153. See Dunker, supra note 81, at 94–96; Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra note 47, at 119–22.
154. Dunker, supra note 81.
155. See id.
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it to ride the teacups. But once a state has used its ticket, there are
no more rides.
This theory has an attractive logic, but, upon closer analysis, we
can see that rejection and ratification function in fundamentally
different ways when it comes to the process of affirming a legislative
bill or resolution. Although a legislature might choose to reject a
proposed amendment by a majority vote, it might also ignore, table,
or otherwise bury it. A proposal may fail for many substantive or
procedural reasons that make it difficult to determine whether a
state has firmly and officially rejected it or is simply kicking the can
down the road. If it were tabled it could come back the following
year. And if there are not enough votes to get the proposal out of
committee one day, there might be enough votes another day. At
what point in the process can one reasonably say that a legislature
has reached finality? A vote to ratify, however, is not so indetermi-
nate, and for that reason most commentators agree that ratification
has a different legal meaning than rejection.156 Because a formal
vote of rejection is the functional equivalent of inaction, logically
both have been treated as non-binding.157
The second theory recognizes the difficulty in determining
whether inaction should count as rejection, and therefore counts
ratification as final, but rejection and inaction as subject to revi-
sion.158 This is the one-way-street theory. And although some are
uncomfortable with its lack of symmetry, it is the more logical posi-
tion given Article V’s reference only to ratification, and the different
156. Because non-ratification reflects the status quo, it makes sense to treat ratification
as the endgame. Until a legislature acts to ratify a proposal, it is in progress, and once ac-
complished, the process ends.
157. Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). The
same is true of legislation. Legislation that fails in one session can return over and over,
with changes or without, and if it is eventually approved, then it becomes legally binding.
And although legislatures could repeal legislation after it has gone into effect, doing so re-
quires a majority vote to affirmatively reject the legislation. That affirmative vote is quite
different from sequestering, tabling, or otherwise rejecting the legislation in the first place.
158. Dunker, supra note 81. There is an interesting, although perhaps academic, issue as
to whether an amendment proposal can linger until it receives the appropriate number of
ratifications, or whether it can be deemed terminally dead when one state legislature, more
than one-quarter, officially rejects it. This question has arisen periodically, but there has
been no satisfactory answer. If it takes thirty-eight states to ratify an amendment proposal,
presumably thirteen can reject it. To date, however, no amendment proposal has been
deemed to be completely rejected even when more than one-quarter of the states have voted
to reject it. The Child Labor Amendment was rejected by fifteen states between 1924 and
1927 and yet it remained alive and well, and subject to a flurry of ratifications in the 1930s.
In litigation as to whether a state can ratify after it has rejected, the topic was often dis-
cussed, with opponents of the ratification arguing that rejection is a firm and final act. How-
ever, the Supreme Court held otherwise in Coleman v. Miller, that states could ratify after
rejecting, which should put to rest the one-bite argument that states may only act once on an
amendment. The decision in Coleman was not conclusive on this issue.
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effects of, and reliance of interests on, ratification and rejection.
Ratification under this model is like asking all the states to get on
a one-way escalator to the top floor. They may get off before reach-
ing the top, as when one house of a state legislature rejects or tables
an amendment proposal. But once the state has reached the top, it
remains there with no way down. They can get on the escalator as
many times as it takes, but once they get to the top, they are done.
The one-way-street theory analogizes ratification to passing legis-
lation where, upon affirmation by all the relevant parties, it be-
comes legally binding and the only way to reverse it would be to
start at the bottom again and re-ascend the escalator.
The third position resurrects the symmetry of the one-bite theory
but would allow states to reject or ratify at will, as many times as
they like.159 Under this theory, no amendment would be ratified
until there were thirty-eight un-rescinded ratifications existing at
a particular moment.160 This can be termed the contemporaneous-
ness theory, which requires a super-majority all being in relative
synchronous agreement, regardless of the uncertainty that might
produce throughout the ratification process as states changed their
positions. Ratification under this model would be akin to thirty-
eight separately-controlled elevators, all going up and down, but if
at some point all thirty-eight are stopped on the top floor, then rat-
ification would be deemed effective. Not surprisingly, this model
increases the difficulty of ratification, potentially destabilizes the
process, and can lengthen the time it takes for an amendment to be
ratified. Consequently, opponents to particular constitutional
amendments have offered up numerous legislative and amendment
proposals to permit rescissions and to impose deadlines designed to
prevent the elevators all reaching the top, thus making ratification
significantly more difficult.
The current view, which has been accepted for the past century
and a half, is the one-way-street theory.161 But some who argue in
favor of rescission advocate for the contemporaneousness theory,
159. Dunker, supra note 81.
160. It is also tempting to view the ratification process, as well as the amendment proposal
process, as a straightforward legislative exercise where one legislature cannot bind a future
one and subsequent legislatures can change their mind. But ratification clearly is not the
same function as legislating. Constitutional proposals, once made, cannot be withdrawn by
a later Congress, unlike simple legislation that can be amended or repealed. Similarly, rat-
ifications by the states are constitutional functions. They have special meaning and require
special rules. Lester Orfield explained that “[t]he legislature in ratifying an amendment is
not exercising a legislative function, just as Congress, when it proposes, is not legislating.”
ORFIELD, supra note 63, at 62.
161. See Dunker, supra note 81.
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while no one seems to advocate for the one-bite theory.162 Although
it is clear that Article V does not mandate a particular model for
ratification, nor does it expressly reject a particular model, the cur-
rent default seems more consistent with the framer’s rejection of
conditional ratifications, analogizes the ratification process to the
legislative process, and protects states from the destabilizing acts
of other states.
Contemporaneousness sounds like a good idea given our commit-
ment to democratic decision-making, but there are concerns with it.
For instance, how long do we leave a window open for states to
achieve contemporaneousness? Is it fair to assume that a state that
has not changed its mind still agrees? Should states have to assert
their support for an amendment every few years, or every time a
new state ratifies? More to the point, however, if there was always
a risk of rescission, proponents of an amendment would need to seek
approval of all fifty states in order to compensate for the possibility
of states rescinding, thus increasing the numbers needed for ratifi-
cation to more than the already significant three-fourths and mov-
ing the process closer to the unanimity requirement of the unwieldy
Articles of Confederation. If the five state rescissions of the ERA
are deemed valid, amendment proponents must seek five additional
ratifications, bringing the total to forty-three, or eighty-six percent
of states, far more than is required by the already onerous three-
fourths of Article V.
And I would argue that the destabilizing effects are the most im-
portant. As the Supreme Court held in M’Culloch v. Maryland, all
the people joined the federal alliance, but they did not intend to give
up to the people of one state the power to negatively affect the na-
tional interests or the sovereignty of other states.163 That same rea-
soning applies even more to the process of ratifying constitutional
amendments than to taxing a national bank. As Chief Justice Mar-
shall expounded:
[i]f any one proposition could command the universal assent of
mankind, we might expect it would be this—that the govern-
ment of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme
within its sphere of action. This would seem to result, neces-
sarily, from its nature. It is the government of all; its powers
162. See Paulsen, supra note 81, at 721–23 (advocating for the contemporaneousness the-
ory); see also Dunker, supra note 81 (stating that the predominant theory is the one-way-
street theory). But seeWise v. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d 1024 (Ky. Ct. App. 1937) (adopting the
one-bite theory).
163. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all. Though
any one state may be willing to control its operations, no state
is willing to allow others to control them.164
Would the people of any one state trust those of another with a
power to control the most insignificant operations of their state
government? We know they would not. Why, then, should we
suppose, that the people of any one state should be willing to
trust those of another with a power to control the operations of
a government to which they have confided their most im-
portant and most valuable interests? In the legislature of the
Union alone, are all represented. The legislature of the Union
alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of
controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence that
it will not be abused. This, then, is not a case of confidence,
and we must consider it is as it really is.165
The people of all the states have created the general govern-
ment, and have conferred upon it the general power of taxa-
tion. . . . But when a state taxes the operations of the govern-
ment of the United States, it acts upon institutions created, not
by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim
no control. It acts upon the measures of a government created
by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in com-
mon with themselves. The difference is that which always ex-
ists, and always must exist, between the action of the whole on
a part, and the action of a part on the whole—between the laws
of a government declared to be supreme, and those of a govern-
ment which, when in opposition to those laws, is not su-
preme.166
Although M’Culloch was about a state exercising sovereignty
over the national bank created by Congress, the underlying princi-
ple is that the constitution establishes national supremacy within
certain bounds, and that individual states may not exercise sover-
eignty over the national interest, or the interests of other states.
For “no state is willing to allow others to control them.”167 This
principle, embedded in our constitutional agreement, provides for
the furtherance of national interests and prevents states from as-
serting their sovereignty at the expense of other states. This
164. Id. at 405.
165. Id. at 431.
166. Id. at 435–36.
167. Id. at 405.
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principle is subverted by rescissions when states can destabilize the
amendment process and undercut the sovereign acts of other states.
The founders’ rejection of conditional ratification of the constitution
is consistent with Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion that a single
state may not upset the balance of power between different sover-
eign states.
A. Nice Sharp Quillets of Law
Given the lean language of Article V, and the lack of relevant ju-
dicial precedent, other relevant sources are the writings of scholars
and commentators who have been studying the process of rescis-
sions since those involving the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet unlike
the opinion of the lawyers for the Kentucky legislators in Chandler
v. Wise,168 I would argue that scholarly opinion is valuable when
there is no better source. In his brief in Chandler, attorney Lafon
Allen opined:
[a] great deal of nonsense has been written on this subject, as
was perhaps to be expected from commentators who, having no
clear precedent to guide them and being free from that sobering
sense of responsibility which affects the judgment of a court,
are prone to seize upon faint analogies and other “nice sharp
quillets of the law” to sustain their conjectures. All such catch-
penny arguments we would put aside, in the very beginning,
believing them to be unworthy of serious consideration. Great
as is the respect due Judge Jameson’s views on questions of
constitutional law, it must be admitted, we think, that he is
responsible for the currency of some of these frail analogues
and precedents, which, through constant repetition, have come
to have a sort of ritualistic importance in the eyes of his disci-
ples.169
Whether they are sharp quillets of law and frail analogues or co-
gent rationales, scholarship may be the only guide out of this intel-
lectual morass of constitutional indeterminacy that is Article V.
Fortunately, despite attorney Allen’s self-serving snipes, there
seems to be no question that scholars concur on the point that re-
scissions are currently ineffective. Until the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, there was no real discussion of state rescissions by treatise
writers. After the civil war amendments, Judge Jameson’s treatise
168. 307 U.S. 474 (1939).
169. Brief for Respondents at 2–3, Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939) (No. 14).
Winter 2021 Constitutional Amendment Rescissions 49
was the first to discuss rescission, and he flatly concluded that re-
scissions were unacceptable.170 He reasoned that if the framers had
intended to permit rescissions, Article V would read:
that the amendment should be valid “when ratified by the leg-
islatures of three-fourths of the States, each adhering to its
vote until three-fourths of all the legislatures should have
voted to ratify.” It is enough to say that such is not the lan-
guage of the Constitution; but that it shall be valid when rati-
fied by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States.171
Jameson’s final conclusion about allowing states to rescind could
not be put better. “Such a mode of transacting business of so trans-
cendent importance would be puerile.”172 David Watson, in 1910,
echoed Jameson’s view that rescissions were impermissible.173
The issue of rescissions did not again grip the scholarly conscious-
ness until the early 1920s with passage of the Eighteenth and Nine-
teenth Amendments. When the Prohibition Amendment passed so
quickly, despite strong popular opposition and procedural obstacles,
a spate of law review articles discussed Congress’ power to impose
obstacles and the general concern over the changing character of
amendments.174 Some attention was paid to the Wadsworth-Gar-
rett plan to issue a constitutional amendment proposal to permit
state rescissions, with the opinion being that it was both a bad idea
and an overreaction to the unprecedented number of amendments
ratified in the early years of the twentieth century.175
Again, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, there was more atten-
tion paid to the issue of rescissions around the revival of the Child
Labor Amendment and the Court’s shift away from the Lochner era
and, again, the consensus was that rescissions were impermissi-
ble.176 Lester Orfield’s treatise in 1942 clearly stated that
170. JAMESON, supra note 102, at 632.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 2 WATSON, supra note 31, at 1310.
174. See Herman V. Ames, The Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in Prac-
tice, 63 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 62 (1924) (discussing the issue of rescissions without
expressing an opinion thereon, although he argues we should not make amendments too
easy); W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, 30 YALE L.J. 321 (1921); William L.
Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power, 33 HARV. L. REV. 223 (1919); Miller,
supra note 91.
175. See Ames, supra note 174, at 70–73; Miller, supra note 91, at 190–91.
176. See generally ORFIELD, supra note 63; Corwin & Ramsey, supra note 64; Frank W.
Grinnell, Petitioning Congress for a Convention: Cannot a State Change Its Mind?, 45 A.B.A.
J. 1164 (1959); Norman Stevens, Comment, Constitutional Law—Ratification of Proposed
Federal Amendment After Prior Rejection, 11 S. CAL. L. REV. 472 (1938).
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rescissions were invalid because the state legislatures were en-
gaged in a special constitutional function when they ratified the
constitution itself and when they ratified amendments.177 Their
power was granted through Article V and was not an incident of
state sovereignty and therefore could not be exercised like normal
legislation.178
With passage of the ERA proposal and then the subsequent re-
scissions, another flood of articles and books emerged discussing the
rescission issue.179 Most recited the history given here and con-
cluded that rescissions are impermissible.180 Some argued that re-
scissions should be allowed.181 Yet all concurred that the issue was
not firmly settled by any Supreme Court precedent either way.
With the ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment in 1992,
another surge in law review articles and books hit the shelves, each
rehashing much of the earlier history.182 And others are arriving
now in response to the final ratification of the ERA.183
With so many voices opining as to the logic of Coleman or the
validity of the Congressional precedent of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment rescissions, it can seem difficult to identify where there is con-
sensus and where there is not. But the evidence is remarkably clear
177. ORFIELD, supra note 63, at 62.
178. Id.
179. See generally FREEDMAN & NAUGHTON, supra note 32; A. Diane Baker, Comment,
ERA: The Effect of Extending the Time for Ratification on Attempts to Rescind Prior Ratifi-
cations, 28 EMORYL.J. 71 (1979); Dunker, supra note 81; Elder, supra note 81; Lynn Andretta
Fishel, Reversals in the Federal Constitutional Amendment Process: Efficacy of State Ratifi-
cations of the Equal Rights Amendment, 49 IND. L.J. 147 (1973); Ginsburg, supra note 98;
Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra note 47; Orrin G. Hatch, The Equal Rights Amendment Exten-
sion: A Critical Analysis, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19 (1979); J. William Heckman, Jr., Rat-
ification of a Constitutional Amendment: Can a State Change Its Mind?, 6 CONN. L. REV. 28
(1973); Kanowitz & Klinger, supra note 100; Planell, supra note 152; Grover Rees III, Throw-
ing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58
TEX. L. REV. 875 (1980); Norman Vieira, The Equal Rights Amendment: Rescission, Extension
and Justiciability, 6 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (1981).
180. See Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra note 47, at 119–22; Allison L. Held et al., The Equal
Rights Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 134 (1997); Kanowitz & Klinger, supra note 100, at 999–
1005.
181. See Hatch, supra note 179, at 46–47; Rees, supra note 179, at 929–30.
182. See generally BERNSTEIN WITH AGEL, supra note 32; Richard B. Bernstein, The
Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 497 (1992); Steward Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200
Years Too Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501 (1994); Ishikawa, supra note 4; Paulsen, supra
note 81; Jean Witter, Extending Ratification Time for the Equal Rights Amendment: Consti-
tutionality of Time Limitations in the Federal Amending Process, 4 WOMEN’SRTS. L. REP. 209
(1978); Comment, The Equal Rights Amendment and Article V: A Framework for Analysis of
the Extension and Rescission Issues, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 494 (1978).
183. See generallyHanlon, supra note 116; Held et al., supra note 180; Wright, supra note
12; Mason Kalfus, Comment, Why Time Limits on the Ratification of Constitutional Amend-
ments Violate Article V, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 437 (1999).
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in the scholarly record. Everyone admits that (1) no state rescission
has ever been recognized, (2) that there is no federal judicial prece-
dent allowing or disallowing state rescissions, (3) that there have
been Congressional efforts in the past both to permit rescissions
and to prohibit them, none of which have successfully passed, (4)
that all state courts, state executives, and many Congressmen have
concurred that rescissions are prohibited, and (5) that the uncer-
tainty of whether or not a state may rescind remains and continues
to overshadow the amendment process.
Scholars disagree, however, on how much weight should be given
to the Congressional precedents of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and
Nineteenth Amendment rescissions. Scholars also disagree on
whether determining the validity of rescissions under Article V is
justiciable or lies solely in the hands of Congress. They disagree as
to whether Madison’s stricture about unconditional ratifications
should apply to amendments, and they disagree as to whether prin-
ciples about conventions should apply to Congressionally-proposed
and legislatively-ratified amendments. They even disagree
whether Congress would have the power to legislate as to the valid-
ity of rescissions. And those who favor allowing rescissions gener-
ally do so on federalism grounds or parity, expressing dislike for the
current asymmetric rule. Those who argue against allowing for re-
scissions usually do so on the grounds that rescissions inject uncer-
tainty, they make amendingmore difficult, that ratification is a spe-
cial constitutional function that is fundamentally different from leg-
islation, and that precedent should be respected. In essence, they
agree that the current rule is that ratification is a one-way street,
but some advocate that the courts should adopt the contemporane-
ousness theory that would permit unlimited rejections and ratifica-
tions.
There is agreement on this, however:
[t]his uncertainty [about the validity of rescissions] has already
delayed the acknowledgment of several amendments well be-
yond their constitutional validity. These amendments—in-
cluding the Twelfth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments—
received the requisite number of ratifications, but with at least
one state attempting to rescind, languished in legitimacy limbo
until an equal number of states as those rescinding had une-
quivocally ratified. This represents an impermissible en-
croachment of the central government on the prerogative of
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states to alter the Constitution with a three-quarters concur-
rence.184
More to the point, Professor William Van Alstyne testified that
allowing states to rescind would be “an atrocious way to run a con-
stitution.”185 It seems to me that Van Alstyne was exactly right, as
rescissions threaten the balance of power between the states in con-
travention of the founders’ insistence that there should be no con-
ditional ratifications and the careful balance of power between the
separate sovereign states articulated throughout the constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, no amendment has ever been held by Con-
gress or the Courts to be void if it has met the technical require-
ments of Article V, which is the potential fate of the ERA. It seems
beyond a doubt that the irregularities of the rescissions are insuffi-
cient to set a precedent of this magnitude. Any interpretation of
Article V’s grant of the power to ratify must promote a reasonably
defensible interpretation that does not undermine the power and
the provision that is being exercised. Unreasonable interpretations
are not constitutional if there are other interpretations that better
align with the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law.186
Allowing states to rescind and throw the process into turmoil is not
only unreasonable but untenable in the heady realm of constitution-
making.
Of course, no state is required to ratify an amendment proposal.
But once it does, it has given its quantum of the life force to the
amendment, and states that come later should be able to rely on the
consequences of prior state acts. If ratifications were not binding,
then early ratifying states would have more power vis-à-vis later
ratifying states—a situation hardly to have been acceptable to the
184. Ishikawa, supra note 4, at 570 (footnotes omitted). The Twelfth Amendment did not
involve a rescission, but it did involve a claim of legal insufficiency. The New Hampshire
legislature ratified the amendment with a simple majority, but the governor vetoed the res-
olution, and the legislature did not have the two-thirds majority to override the governor’s
veto. Although New Hampshire’s ratification was most likely the final one needed, the Sec-
retary of State did not certify and publish the amendment until after another state, Tennes-
see, ratified. See Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp 1107, 1149 (D. Idaho 1981).
185. Equal Rights Amendment Extension: Hearings on H.J. Res. 638 Before the Subcomm.
on Civ. & Const. Rts. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. at 138
(1977) (testimony of Prof. Van Alstyne).
186. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 393 (1821) (“We must endeavour [sic] so to con-
strue [Constitutional provisions] as to preserve the true intent and meaning of the instru-
ment.”).
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thirteen states that understood at the founding that ratification of
the constitution could not be conditional.
And for those involved in the difficult political process of garner-
ing support, rescissions impose a significant hardship, requiring
that they focus on ratifications in all fifty states because later states
can never know if an earlier state will stick by its ratification. Pro-
hibiting the destabilizing effects of rescissions from upsetting the
reliance of other states, like prohibiting state taxation of the na-
tional bank, is a principle deeply rooted in our constitution. States
must play fair and cannot have an undue influence in national pol-
itics.
